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What Was Wrong with the Record?
Ellen D. Katz
SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER offers three reasons forwhy the record Congress amassed to support
the 2006 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act
(VRA) was legally insufficient to justify the stat-
ute’s continued regional application: (1) the prob-
lems Congress documented in 2006 were not as
severe as those that prompted it to craft the regime
in 1965; (2) these problems did not lead Congress to
alter the statute’s pre-existing coverage formula;
and (3) these problems did not exclusively involve
voter registration and the casting of ballots.1
These observations may all be true, but that they,
individually or collectively, suffice to establish the
record’s inadequacy in this case is both a novel
and a potentially far-reaching holding.
Shelby County invalidates Section 4(b) of the
VRA, a provision that ‘‘covered’’ jurisdictions if
they utilized a ‘‘test or device’’ as a prerequisite to
voting and had low levels of voter participation on
specified dates between 1964 and 1972.2 Once cov-
ered, jurisdictions could no longer use their test or
device and could not implement any electoral
changes without first showing that the proposed
change would be nondiscriminatory. Shelby County
deems 4(b) obsolete, and concludes that nothing in
the 15,000 pages of evidence Congress amassed in
support of the VRA’s reauthorization justifies con-
tinued utilization of the coverage formula. Much
of the novelty and magnitude of the decision lies
in the majority’s reasons why.
The first reason concerns the severity of the prob-
lems documented in the record. Chief Justice Rob-
erts’ majority opinion observes that ‘‘[r]egardless
of how to look at the record.no one can fairly
say that it shows anything approaching the ‘perva-
sive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ dis-
crimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that
clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions
from the rest of the Nation at that time.’’3
The Chief Justice is certainly correct about this
fact. To be sure, his opinion gives short shrift to
the role of deterrence and the notable ways this
operational regime had previously shaped public
conduct on the ground. But even if deterrence
were to be considered and a good deal of backslid-
ing comes to pass—the early signs in this regard are
not encouraging—no one anticipates Jim Crow will
return full force now that the preclearance regime
has been rendered inoperative. Backsliding may
well prove to be ‘‘‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘wide-
spread,’ and ‘rampant,’’’ but the brazen defiance of
constitutional norms that defined the pre-VRA
South will not. Whatever happens, and a good
deal of it may be ugly, it will not rise to the level
of what prompted statute in first place.
That’s good news, as far as it goes, but the notion
that misconduct so severe might be necessary to sus-
tain the preclearance regime is astounding. Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent argues that contemporary uncon-
stitutional conduct in covered jurisdictions remains
widespread, particularly considering the preclear-
ance regime’s documented deterrent effect.4 The
majority likely disagreed, thinking that the cited
conduct sounded more in discriminatory effect
than intent or simply tracked a jurisdiction’s
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inability to disprove animus. And yet, the majority
opinion notably declines to dispute Justice Gins-
burg’s characterization of the evidence including
the scope of unconstitutional conduct she describes.
Instead, the majority stakes out what appears to be
a new, constitutionally significant line between what
we might call contained and extreme unconstitutional
conduct. Shelby County suggests that Congress may
employ a remedy like preclearance only to reach
the extreme Jim Crow variety, but not to address the
more contained type of unconstitutional conduct we
see today. That is, it suggests that Congress may not
select what it reasonably believes is the most effective
way to remedy unconstitutional racial discrimination
in voting when that discrimination falls short of the
type that defined Alabama in 1965.
It is decidedly new law to hold that Congress
lacks this power. Such a holding departs not just
from Warren Court precedent, which recognized
that Congress possesses close to plenary authority
when crafting remedies for unconstitutional racial
discrimination in voting.5 It also departs from
Rehnquist Court precedent, which required a tight
connection between remedies and unconstitutional
conduct but did not distinguish between worthy
and less worthy constitutional violations.6
And yet, Shelby County does not rest exclusively
on this distinction. The decision posits a ‘‘more fun-
damental problem’’ with the record. Specifically,
the record ‘‘played no role in shaping the statutory
formula before us today.’’7 The Court explains that
Congress opted to ‘‘reenact[]’’ the original coverage
formula when it reauthorized the VRA in 2006 and
accordingly ‘‘did not use the record it compiled
to shape a coverage formula grounded in current
conditions.’’8
This objection is puzzling. It is true, of course,
that Congress did not change the coverage formula
in 2006 and that jurisdictions that had been previ-
ously covered under that formula remained covered
after reauthorization. It is also true that, on a clean
slate, a decision to regulate unregulated entities
based on voter participation decades ago would be
difficult to defend. One might well agree with the
Court that ‘‘[if] Congress had started from scratch
in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted the pres-
ent coverage formula.’’ What is far from clear, how-
ever, is why the Court thinks ‘‘that is exactly what
Congress has done.’’9
Congress was not starting from scratch in 2006.
Instead, it was considering whether a remedy every-
one agreed had been lawfully imposed should con-
tinue. To answer that question, Congress assembled
a detailed record documenting ‘‘current conditions’’
in covered jurisdictions, based on which it con-
cluded the remedy remained necessary in the places
where it applied. To be sure, Congress might have
decided otherwise. It might have chosen to adjust
the scope of coverage either by adding new jurisdic-
tions in which electoral problems appeared signifi-
cant or by releasing those with relatively clean
records. It opted instead to maintain the existing
regime and the embedded opportunities to refine
coverage through the bailout and bail-in procedures.
There are solid arguments on both sides as to
whether the record was adequate to justify the par-
ticular reauthorization Congress enacted. And yet,
the Shelby County majority posits a ‘‘fundamental
problem’’ with the record that appears to have little
to do with the record’s substantive content. Instead,
the majority condemns Congress for failing to use
the evidence it collected ‘‘to shape’’ a coverage for-
mula. By ‘‘shape,’’ the majority presumably means
to revise that formula or craft a new one, given
that the opinion rejects the idea that Congress
might have rationally concluded that current condi-
tions justified preserving the existing coverage for-
mula. The suggestion seems to be that the
Constitution required Congress to revise rather
than maintain the coverage formula no matter
what evidence it documented.
Why? The Court required no such editorial revi-
sions to justify the VRA’s 1982 reauthorization, in
which Congress also opted to retain the coverage
formula unchanged. More critically, Shelby County
does not explain why Congress’s decision to pre-
serve the formula was not ‘‘shaped’’ by the record
in the same way a decision to revise it would have
been. Nor does the opinion explain why the Consti-
tution might deem this distinction relevant. Put
another way, standing alone, the fact that Congress
chose to reauthorize the existing formula proves
nothing. If the argument is that there is a mismatch
between coverage and unconstitutional conduct, the
Court would have to consider the record with
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greater care. And it would have to confront more
openly the deference usually accorded Congress
when finding facts.
This brings us to what I am counting as a third
objection to the record, albeit one that might have
been intended as an illustration of the second. Chief
Justice Roberts’ opinion observes that the conditions
Congress documented in 2006 encompassed issues
beyond the act of casting a ballot and dealt largely
with ‘‘second-generation’’ barriers such as racial
vote dilution. The Chief Justice insists that such bar-
riers are unrelated to the concerns that animated cov-
erage in the original formula. After all, the coverage
formula ‘‘is based on voting tests and access to the
ballot, not vote dilution.’’ As such, the conditions
Congress documented in 2006 do not ‘‘cur[e]’’ the
problem—namely, that Congress did not use the
record to ‘‘shape’’ the coverage formula.10
Far from clarifying matters, this objection is
counterfactual in multiple respects. It is true that,
largely because the VRA banned literacy tests, so-
called ‘‘second-generation’’ devices became more
prominent objects for concern in the 1970s and
they remain so today. And yet, ‘‘second-generation’’
problems, such as the practice of manipulating dis-
trict lines to inhibit minority influence, predate the
VRA by decades.11 Such practices stand with the
white primary, the literacy test, the poll tax, and
other tactics that were used concurrently in the Jim
Crow South to ensure that African-American citi-
zens lacked the ability to cast ‘‘meaningful’’ ballots
and to ‘‘strip’’ them ‘‘of every vestige of influence’’
in the selection selecting the public officials.12
In short, the practices grouped as ‘‘second gener-
ation’’ are not unrelated to the concerns that first
animated Congress to enact the VRA. They were
part and parcel of the practices the original statute
targeted. The Supreme Court itself recognized as
much in 1969.13 Justice Harlan disagreed at the
time, and Justices Thomas and Scalia would do
so later, but a majority of the Court has repeatedly
recognized congressional intent for the VRA to
apply to these practices and confirmed Congress’s
power to deploy the VRA in this way.
True, the coverage formula invalidated by Shelby
County was based on the use of tests and devices
and low voter participation. But Congress selected
those elements as the ‘‘trigger’’ because they captured
with remarkable accuracy the places that engaged in
the broader range of conduct (including so-called
‘‘second generation’’ conduct) that had rendered the
Fifteenth Amendment a nullity throughout the pre-
VRA South. The statutory ‘‘trigger’’ linked tests and
devices to low participation, but the statute’s target
was never so limited.14
As a result, the Court’s dismissal of the second-
generation evidence as off-topic is difficult to
fathom. Indeed, all three reasons Shelby County
gives for the record’s inadequacy are deeply puz-
zling. To be sure, these reasons may ultimately
prove to be of limited consequence. The first
might not stand alone, while the second and third
concerns might be easily resolved with simple stat-
utory amendments. Alternatively, however, all three
may signal deeper skepticism about congressional
judgment in this realm and, as such, portend more
rigorous examination of congressional action in
the future.
Given this uncertainty, Shelby County presents a
serious challenge for those shaping federal voting
rights law going forward. Should a legislative
response to the decision prove feasible politically,
the contours of what measures might ultimately sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny remains far from clear.
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